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Since the promUlgation of Pope Paul VI's encyclical Humanae Vitae, (HV)l
numerous theologians have dissented from that magisterial teaching for various
reasons. Chief among the arguments raised to reject the document's prohibition
of contraception has been the charge that the Pope's moral methodology is
grounded in a physicalistic understanding ofthe natural law. That is, one that is
based on the form of natural law argumentation which proceeds according to the
following mistaken pattern: "since nature tends to act in this way, men have a
duty to act in this way (that is, according to the way nature acts)."2 When applied
to the teaching on sexual morality that is found in the encyclical, this physicalism
consists in the contention that, "the moral evaluation of sexual intercourse rests
entirely upon the structure and form which the act achieves. This form is basically
the physiological process of insemination."3
One scholar who has made this argument against HV is the Louvain
University moral theologian and former editor of Lou vain Studies, Joseph A.
Selling. Moreover, Selling claims that the teaching set forth in HV is not the
traditional teaching of the Church. Rather it is a reading of the natural law that is
found in the documents of the papal magisterium of Popes Pius XI and Pius XII.
Selling contends that the traditional teaching of the Church, as expressed in
Vatican Council II, particularly in Gaudium et Spes (GS)4 (nn. 47-52), is
grounded in a better understanding of the human person and conjugal morality,
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one that superseded
· .. the natural law approach of positing a biological norm (the form of the act) and
replaced it with a personalistic model of morality (responsible parenthood) that
insured the continuity of the fundamental teaching on marriage and elicited concrete
norms based upon the "human person and his acts" (GS, 51).5

Thus, because of HV's physicalistic moral teaching, it
· . . exhibits either a denial or a functional misunderstanding of the teaching put forth in
GS on marriage and represents a regression in the evolution of concrete norms which
had been elaborated in Vatican II. In this sense, HV cannot be said to represent the
ongoing tn dition of the Church's teaching on conjugal morality as a whole. Rather it
is related only to past papal teaching and as such can be considered as a historical
document which was dated at the very time it was promulgated.6

Furthermore, Selling oddly holds that in HV, "Pope Paul never really intended
to condemn every form of artificial birth control for the mature, responsible,
loving married couple."7 According to Selling, the Pope's reason for writing
HV was to restate a position on the specific question of contraception that Pope
Paul himself realized was "dated" and "inadequate," but nonetheless "safe."
He did so because he "feared for the implications of simply saying that
contraception was in itself acceptable."8
This paper will consider whether the teaching of HV on the regulation of
births is physicalist and thus incompatible with the teaching of GS. My intent is
to respond to Selling's arguments in order to expound and defend the
personalistic basis ofHV against the physicalism that he finds characteristic of its
natural law approach to birth control. 9
The paper will consist of two major parts. In part one I will analyze the
central moral teaching of HV concerning contraception. Here I will attempt to
show that HV, contrary to Selling, is personalistic in its articulation of moral
norms. To accomplish this, I will first discuss Selling's own view ofHV. In part
two I will respond to Selling's contention that HV is not harmonious with GS,
and therefore, opposed to the developing tradition.

Part 1: Is the Teaching of Humanae Vitae Physicalistic? A Response
Selling's Critique of Humanae Vitae
We begin with Selling's analysis of the central moral argumentation of HV
(nn. 10-14). The encyclical holds that contraception violates natural law. Why
contraception does so, according to Selling, derives from a physicalistic
interpretation. "It is proposed that 'the act of marriage' is intrinsically oriented
to procreation and can never be violated with respect to its natural structure
(HV,ll)."10 According to Selling, the Pope identifies the "natural law with the
intentional will of God."ll This
· .. interpretation of the natural law offers the elaboration of an "objective moral
order" (HV, IO), intentionally created by God and directing a "right order of
priorities." This order is discernible from "the nature of marriage and its acts"
(HV,IO) .. ."1 2

Hence, this criteria, Selling argues, contrasts with that found in GS,51 . 13
40
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In HV, 12 the Pope then speaks of the
. .. inseparable connection between the unitive and procreative meanings of the act
which is inherent inthe nature of man and woman and which must be safeguarded in all
circumstances ... The violation of either of these meanings is said to contradict the will of
God and flow from the idea that man has no dominion over his generative powers which
"by their very nature" are oriented to raising up life (RV,l3).14

HV, 14 concludes by excluding "any action which either before, at the moment
of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation whether as an end or as means" (note omitted). Selling states that the
"justification of this teaching is based upon the assertion that artificial
contraception is morally evil and, by virtue of the fact that it goes against the
natural moral order, is "intrinsece inhonestum. "'15
Selling offers a concise account of his physicalist charge when he coments on
what he sees as the essence of the argument being proposed in HV,13 (a virtual
summary of the Pope's whole argument according to Selling). He writes:
God created the procreative/acuity according to natural laws which are evident in an
examination of the structure of the sexual act. The fulfillment of that act, the process of
insemination, is oriented to fertilization and the generation of children. To frustrate that
process in any way is considered wrong not because it avoids the birth of a child but
because it goes against nature (the natural law) which is equivalent to the will of God. It
does not matter whether or not a particular act is potentially fertile for it is the structure of
the act which is normative. 16

Selling holds that in the final analysis, HV's moral norms rest on the claim that
"the very nature and purpose of human sexuality is intrinsically oriented to
procreation."I? And because HV does not require that every conjugal sexual act
"be concretely oriented to procreation . .. the [integrity of the] 'natural' structure
of human sexuality" must remain safeguarded from human interference. IS This is
what can only be meant by "procreative meaning." Therefore, what is normative
is the natural structure.
In essence then, HV's moral propositions involve "an act-centered approach to
the morality of sexual intercourse based upon its physiological structure as it is
said to be determined by the naturallaw."19 Like Popes Pius XI and XII before
him, Paul VI's teaching
. .. isolates the material act of intercourse and forces it to carry the entire meaning of the
conjugal relationship, it assumes the biological norm of the physical integrity of that act
to judge its licitness and it implies the doctrine of the primary and secondary ends of
marriage (mainly applied to the act of coitUS).20

I believe the preceding account accurately captures Selling's argument against
the teaching of HV. We must now respond to it and develop a sounder
interpretation of the encyclical.
Contraception, the Natural Law, and the Teaching of Humanae Vitae

Basic to my commentary on HV will be a discussion of its fundamental moral
principles and teaching. 21 Because the Pope bases his teaching on the natural law
(though "as illuminated and enriched by divine Revelation," HV,4),22 which "the
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Church is competent in her magisterium to interpret" (Ibid), we will examine
HV's natural law doctrine on birth control.
Pope Paul begins his treatment of the question of human procreation by
situating it within the context of an "integral vision'" of the human person. 23 "It is
the whole man and the whole mission to which he is called that must be
considered:" both his earthly existence and his eternal destiny (HV,7). The Pope
understands that because this issue involves the entire person as a body-soul
unity, it cannot be adequately resolved by limiting one's focus to a particular
aspect of the person's nature (Ibid). Moreover, he states that his intention is to
treat the question of conjugal love and responsible parenthood with "special
reference" to what the Vatican Council II taught in GS (Ibid).
The Nature of Marriage and Conjugal Love

Before turning to the Pope's analysis of responsible parenthood and the
question of contraception, it is first necessary to summarize his understanding of
marriage and conjugallove. 24 If one overlooks these realities, one distorts the
deeply personalistic framework from which the Pope was approaching the issue
and thereby trying to faithfully expound the insights of the Council.And though
the Pope is speaking to all people of good will, he writes particularly to those who
see that the "transmission of human life is a most serious role in which married
people collaborate freely and responsibily with God the Creator" (HV,l).
According to Paul VI, conjugal love originates in God's creative love. Because its
source is the Father's own fruitful and generative love, one can only see the "true
nature and nobility" of marital love from the perspective of Divine love (HV,8).
Flowing from God's love, marriage and the love therein is a means "to effect in
man His loving design." Due to God's plan for marriage, when spouses embrace
in the marital act, which is the "mutual gift of themselves ... specific and
exclusive to them alone [they] develop that union of two persons in which they
perfect one another, cooperating with God" in the procreation and education of
new life (Ibid).25
In HV,9 the Pope turns his reflections to the distinctive features of conjugal
love. 26 Following the thought ofGS, Paul VI says that this love is "fully human,"
reflecting the body-soul unity of the human person. It is not merely "natural
instinct or emotional drive. It is also, and above all, an act of the free will ... "
Ultimately, this love is meant to unify the spouses so that they become "in a way
one heart and one soul" (HV,9).
This love is also "total" - a unique form of "personal friendship" which involves
the couple's reciprocal self-giving in every aspect of their married life (Ibid).
Moreover, marital love is 'Jaithful and exclusive. "The Pope refers here to the
experience of married couples as one way of showing that fidelity pertains to "the
nature of marriage" and is "the source of profound and enduring happiness" (Ibid).
Finally, this love is 'Jecund. "Thus conjugal love desires to transcend the "loving
interchange" of the spouses. It strives to "go beyond this to bring new life into being"
(Ibid). The Pope then quotes GS,50: "Marriage and conjugal love are by their
nature ordained toward the procreation and education of children. Children are
really the supreme gift of marriage..."
42
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In describing the features of conjugal love this way, Pope Paul VI has
accurately captured the teaching ofGS on this singular form of human love. 27
This teaching will set the context for the Pope's discussion of responsible
parenthood. However, because the encyclical is written to deal with the precise
question of how conjugal love is to respond to the good of human life in the
concrete act of sexual intercourse, the procreative aspect of conjugal love is of
course the main focus of the encyclical. Nevertheless, the Pope situates his
judgement within the context of each particular conjugal act - an act meant to
be both unitive and open to new human life.

Toward an Understanding of the Encyclical's Norm
In HV, 10 the Pope begins to describe the exigencies of responsible
parenthood. "With regard to the biological processes, responsible parenthood
means an awareness of, and respect for, their proper functions. In the
procreative faculty the human mind discerns biological laws that apply to the
human person" (HV, 10, emphasis added).
The Pope then immediately adds that responsible parenthood involves other
important aspects as well: the use of reason and will to control one's "innate
drives and emotions"; the necessity of attending to one's own "physical,
economic, psychological and social conditions" in order to determine whether
to increase one's family or not, either for a certain or indefinite period of time;
and most importantly, responsible parenthood requires the spouses to observe
"the objective moral order which was established by God." This objective
order they interpret through a "right conscience" (Ibid). In summary,
responsible parenthood requires that the couple maintain "a right order of
priorities, recognize their own duties toward God, themselves, their families"
and the human family (Ibid).
Selling argues that "a good deal of weight is placed upon 'biological
laws' ... " in the preceding passage. We must point out however that HV never
"identifies 'natural biological laws' with natural law in the moral sense."28 As
William E. May has shown, the Pope states that the discovery of these
"biological laws" is an act of human reason which recognizes these laws as an
aspect of the human person. May writes that with this claim the Pope is
"seeking to express the teaching of Vatican Council II that human sexuality,
which includes the power to generate new life, surpasses in nature and dignity
the sexuality of non-human animals; human sexuality is integrally
'personal."'29 In line with the personalism of the Council, the Pope understands
that our generative sexual power is constitutive of who we are as human
beings. "It is not some sub-human biological function; it is a personal good."30
In addition, May notes what is not often recognized in discussion of this
passage. The Pope in fact refers to a text of St. Thomas which argues that,
[T]here are many "first" principles or precepts of the natural law insofar as human
reason, as practical, naturally grasps certain basic "goods" of the human person as the
good that is to be done and pursued in and through human choices and actions, and
among these basic goods is that of human life-in-its-transmission, or the good of
procreation.31
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Since one of "the first or basic principles of naturalla w or practical reason is that
human persons are to respect and honor" this good [the procreative good] in their
choices," they must not freely will to "set it aside."'32
Though Selling mentions the Pope's reference to St. Thomas, he does not
adequately deal with its significance for Paul's thought on the question of
regulating fertility. One way of expressing this significance is to say, unlike
animal reproduction, human procreation "is dire.cted to the generation of a
human being, and so by its nature it surpasses the purely biological order and
involves a whole series of personal values."33
The Pope concludes n. 10 by arguing that by reason of these various exigences,
the couple's decision concerning parenthood does not rely solely on subjective
motives, but rather must also correspond to "the will of God the Creator. The
very nature of marriage and its use makes His will clear, while the constant
teachings of the Church" makes its evident. 34
In n. 11 of HV, Pope Paul builds upon the preceeding section and writes what
might appear to be a superfluous line: "God has wisely ordered laws of nature
and the incidence of fertility in such a way that successive births are already
naturally spaced through the inherent operation of these laws." Martin
Rhonheimer states that, just like the "biological laws" identified in n. 10 these
"laws of nature" are not natural law in a moral sense. Rather, Rhonheimer
argues, these "biological rhythms of fertility" are mentioned here "to draw a
fundamental conceptual distinction: The distinction between voluntary induced
infertility and naturally given infertility."35 However, "absolutely no reason is
intended to be given here for settling the question why" procreative acts
intentionally rendered infertile are immoraJ.36
Neverthless, we would strongly affirm that these biological laws of nature do
in fact pertain to the very nature of the human person (not non-human nature).
And "since in human life nothing is merely biological, everything is personal,"37
we cannot see these physical laws as sub-personal. Yet it must also be noted that
any "argument which tries to defend naturally given structures from being altered
by human intervention needs afurtherargument" based not on the "'naturalness'
of natural patterns, but which needs to be an additional ethical argument showing
the moral relevance of natural patterns."38
Thus the Pope in the very same passage - after recalling GS's teaching that
the conjugal act is "noble and worthy" (n. 49) - begins by affirming the moral
goodness of marital sexual intercourse even when pt~rformed with the knowledge
that the act is naturally infertile. Why? Because of the marital act's capacity for
expressing and strengthening "the union of husband and wife" (HV, 11) apart
from any realization of procreation. In the next sentence he recognizes that "as
experience shows ... new life is not the result of each and every act of sexual
intercourse" (Ibid).
The previous point is crucial for making sense of the fundamental norm which
is set forth in HV,ll. The norm states that "every marital act must of necessity
retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of new life" ("ut quilibet
matrimonii usus ad vitam humanam procreandam per se destinatus permaneat, "
(HV, 11, emphasis added). Thus, because naturally infertile intercourse, along
44
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with periodic abstinence is considered licit by the Church, the correct way to
understand the principle articulated above is in the category of intention rather
than physiology.39 Hence, we interpret the norm this way:
It is wrong for those who engage in marital intercourse to attempt to impede the
transmission of life, which they think their act otherwise might bring about. For if they
do try to impede that to which their act of itself might lead, they choose to close it to new
life.40

Put negatively, the norm simply implies the following: "Contraception is always
wrong."41
Given the previous observations, I would argue that Selling is simply mistaken
in seeing that,
[T]he central moral criterion for the moral evaluation of conjugal sexual relations
remains the performance of complete, unimpeded coitus terminating in the deposit of
male sperm in the female genital track, irregardless of whether a given act is known
beforehand to be fertile.42

The non-physicalistic character of the Pope's teaching is made even more
obvious when in HV, 14 he writes: "excluded is any action which either before, at
the moment of, or, after sexual intercourse, [that] is specifically intended to
prevent procreation - whether as an end or as a means" (emphasis added).
The Basis of the Norm

Pope Paul VI grounds the Church's teaching "on the inseparable connection,
established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the
unitive significance and procreative significance which are both inherent to the
marriage act" (HV, 12).43 How are we to interpret this moral-anthropological
principle? We should not understand this "inseparable connection" in a literal
sense. For contraception and sterility break this connection every time. We must
interpret it in another way. Joseph Seifert argues that the inseparability principle
. .. cannot mean afactual or actual inseparability but only one that is situated on that
level of the essence of marriage which ought to be respected and realized but does not
have to be realized. We could speak of a moral rather than a factual inseparability.44

Why "ought"? Here of course we are at the crux of the issue. The encyclical holds
that contraception violates the inseparability of the two meanings of the marital
act. How so? By acting against the procreative meaning (and the unitive meaning
also?), But again, why is acting against the procreative good wrong?
It seems that because many have focused on language in the encyclical which
would appear at times to imply an emphasis on "natural processes," "biological
laws," "laws of nature," etc., they have not grasped the real moral argument
which is present in the document (however brief and schematic it might be). Thus
when Selling writes: to frustrate the process of insemination "is considered wrong
not because it avoids the birth of a child but because it goes against nature,"45 he
misinterprets the teaching of HV. Contraception is wrong for neither of these
reasons: The former would rule out periodic abstinence and the latter would
simply be physicalism. Rather, based on our interpretation of the encyclical,
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contraception is immoral because one performs
... an action that in itself and directly has only one objective: to keep an act of intercourse
from being fruitful, to see to it that a new human life does not come to be in and through
an act of the kind in which new human life can come to be. The contraceptive act is
directly aimed against the realization of the procreative good. One is not simply
declining to promote that good; one is taking positive steps against it. 46

One contracepts precisely because one does not want new life to come to be in
the very act of intercourse that one knows could lead to the initiation of another
human being's existence. Such an act however involves "a morally wrong
response to the new human person who is [possibly] 'about to become real in
conception."'47 Put another way:
The contraceptive choice requires us to set aside the openness of sexual union to the good
of human life in its transmission. It likewise requires us, of our own free will, to set aside
the blessing of fertility (an aspect of our being as human persons). It thus requires us to set
our wills, our persons, against these great human goods. It therefore violates basic norms
of reasonable human choice required by practical reason, and is therefore not a morally
good choice.48

I would argue that BV is simply saying that a marital act has both a
love-expressing meaning and a life-giving meaning. These meanings or human
goods are the reasons for which we engage in sexual intercourse in the first place:
In fact, the various ends or goods associated with our sexuality - the child, a unique
kind of friendship, sexual fulfillment through our bodiliness - are what make sense of
the marital act. They make it comprehensible and ... "doable" ...

by serving as "the principles of human action."49 Since human persons act on
behalf of ends which are perceived as goods, the very goods of the marital act
render the act intelligible.
Now, BV argues that if one chooses to attack either (or both) of these
meanings, these goods, one acts immorally. For instance, referring to the unitive
good, the Pope observes that "a conjugal act imposed on one's partner without
regard to his or her condition or personal and reasonable wishes ... is no true act
of love, and therefore offends the moral order" with respect to its requirements
for spouses (BV,l3). Concerning the procreative good, the Pope writes: spouses
"must also recognize that an act of mutual love which impairs the capacity to
transmit life which God ... through specific laws, has built into it, frustrates Bis
design ... and contradicts" the Creator's will (Ibid., emphasis added).
From these two passages it is clear that BV is concerned not with "the physical
structure of the act as such but rather with the intentionalities that are expressed in
it."so Thus the Pope teaches,
.. . what is wrong or immoral, what is contrary to the nature of the human person and his
acts and to the meaning of marriage, are genital acts in which either the unitive or the
procreative meaning of the marital act is repUdiated. What is morally of significance is
the intent to reject either one of these great goods. 51

When Pope Paul argues, "just as man does not have unlimited dominion over
his body in general, so also ... he has no such dominion over his sexual faculties,"
46
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we should not see here the biologism that Selling alleges. For the Pope
immediately adds: "for these are concerned by their very nature with the
generation of life, of which God is the source" (HV, 13, emphasis added.)
Again, our way of interpreting the "inseparability principle" is made even
more evident when the Pope provides his reason for its truthfulness: because
... the fundamental nature of the marriage act, while uniting husband and wife in the
closest intimacy, also renders them capable of generating new life - this as a result of
laws written into the actual nature of man and of woman (HV, 12, emphasis added).

The pope continues by stating that if both "essential qualities" are maintained, the
marital act fully preserves "its sense of true mutual love and its ordination to the
supreme responsibility of parenthood to which man is called" (Ibid).52
Given our analysis, Selling is clearly wrong to state that "HV ... sought to
exclude only those actions which positively interfere with the physiological
process. "53 What is indeed immoral is the choice to intend - because one sees that
this act, here and now, can transmit human life - to make one's act of sexual
intercourse intentionally infertile. In Selling's grounding of HV's moral reasoning
on physicalistic grounds, he has missed its central claim: what is at issue is not
whether or not contraception violates natural processes (just as natural processes),
but whether basic human goods have been respected or rejected. We have shown
that in the contraceptive act, one violates the good of procreation. Does it violate
other goods, such as the unitive good, as many authors have suggested?
John Finnis has strongly argued that "contracepted sex, like other forms of
non-conjugal sexual activity, settles for the appearance [of a good] rather than the
reality ... "54 Finnis states:
. . . contracpeted sexual intercourse is in vital respects a simulation of conjugal
intercourse, i.e., of intercourse that not merely contributes in some way to the stability
and peace of the marriage (as a husband's resort to a good-time girl may be intended to),
but that really, as an act of will bodily expressed, is adequately expressive of the conjugal
good, one must refuse to entertain any sexual activity which involves turning against
either the exclusive friendship of the spouses . . . or the procreativeness that is the
rationale of that friendship and of its commitment to exclusiveness. 55

When one realizes that the conjugal good is composed of these
"interdependent"56 aspects, one sees that in attacking one aspect (the procreative
for example), you harm the other (and vice versa).57
Hence, in choosing to contracept one acts immorally. For this act carries out a
choice to (wrongly) impede the instantiation of the basic good of human life. This
is why contraception violates natural law and its fundamental first principles.
One's choice and/ or act is not only contra-life (i.e., a choice which involves one's
will in a basic stance against life), but it is also destructive of other basic human
goods (e.g., mutual self-giving or friendship, bodily integrity or fertility, and
personal integrity).58 Thus we can say the following:
There is a whole constellation of goods clustered in the marital act on behalf of which
one acts and which makes sense of that act ... One must always remain open to all of
these basic goods because they make sense of the marital act. To engage in marital
intercourse while acting against one or more of those goods would make the act, to a
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greater or lesser degree, senseLess.59

Selling argues that in HV, "each act is considered in itself instead of in its
relation to the whole of the relationship."60 While it would take another paper to
adequately deal with this argument, other authors have already cogently
answered this objection. 61 Ultimately this analysis, as well as Selling's acceptance
of the distinction between moral and pre-moral evil ("The fully human act is
morally qualifiable only after the consideration of all relevant factors"),62 rests on
a proportionalist moral theory.63 However, proportionalism has been capably
criticized from many different angles.64
We conclude therefore that HV is personalistic teaching teaching of its deep
respect for all the basic goods of the human person. Contrary to Selling, it does
not erect the physical process as a biological norm, isolating it from the other
goods of marriage.65
Part II: Is Humanae Vitae Contrary to the Tea1ching of Gaudium et Spes?
A Comparison

In his critique of HV, Selling has raised many objections (besides the
physicalist argument) which, he believes, shows the clear discontinuity between
the encyclical and GS.66
Selling states that the following major points are found in GS67:
1. The relegation of the doctrine of the hierarchy of ends to a mere historical
reference (n.4).
2. The priority of speaking of conjugal love ov(~r procreation in marriage (n.
8), along with the omission of procreation in the discussion of conjugal love
(n. 9).

3. Procreation is a gift and the crown of both conjugal love and marriage and
not the purpose, end or justification of sexual relations (n.1I).
4. The affirmation of the specificity of human sexuality and a rejection of
biological norms governing sexual activity (n. 16).
5. The objective criteria for making responsible moral decisions with respect
to determining and directing human activity are based upon "the nature of
the human person and their acts" (n. 17).
Space allows me to respond to only the latter two points listed - though I believe
they are the most central.

Gaudium et Spes, Humanae Vitae, and the Question of Biological Norms
In part one, we saw how Selling argued that for HV, the natura actus governs
the morality of conjugal acts. According to Selling, this is to depart from the
teaching of GS, which
.. . would reject the notion that human activity in the context of moral responsibility is
reducible to the application of rules which minimalistically conform to biological
facticity. The observation of a simple biological fact, that the engagement in sexual
intercourse may result in the meeting of sperm and ovum, and possibly in conception,
does not constitute a norm for human activity. Biological facts are simply facts and
nothing more. 68

48
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But as we argued, neither is HV concerned with "the application of rules which
. .. conform to biological facticity" or with the observation of biological facts
which "constitute a norm for human activity." For Pope Paul, biological givens
do not translate into moral norms.
Rather, the Pope's encyclical was shown to be concerned, not with the natural
structure of the act, the natura actus, but with the person's intention with respect
to the good of human life when engaging in the act of marital intercourse. Insofar
as one knows that his or her procreative power can transmit the life of a new
human person, this "simple biological fact" (Selling) becomes morally relevant
- not because one regards the biology in and of itself as sacrosanct (apart from
the person), but because one realizes that an act of sexual intercourse has the
capacity to bring another human being into the world. Thus it is the moral
significance of the activity itself that HV is concerned to protect, not the physical
structure of the act. One's procreative potential is morally relevant not only
because it is already an intrinsic good of the person, but because of what this
"potential" refers to: the good of human life - which can result when one
chooses to procreate.
Yet in affirming that biological processes do not constitute moral norms, we
must also remember nonetheless, that we are speaking not only about the
potential outcome of one's procreative power (i.e., human life), but also of the
sexual act itself which,
...when performed in its conjugal and human integrity, is not a thing by itself [natura
actus?], nor a piece of a human being which mayor must be sacrificed in favor of the
whole organism. [For] sexuality is not so much a part of man, as a dimension of his
personality. Man has other things, and he may rightfully exercise dominion over them.
But a person's sexuality is on the level of being, ofthis person in his sexual connotations.
Over this dimension of being a man does not have true and proper dominion. If a man
were to attempt such dominion, be would no longer be acting in his personal identity and
dignity; rather he would be an object of manipulation.69

These reflections of Tettamanzi (who was not commenting on GS) more
accurately capture the thought of GS. For after affirming that the "sexual
characteristics of man and the human faculty of reproduction wonderfully
exceed" those of all other living creatures, the Council Fathers then write: "Hence
the acts themselves which are proper to conjugal love and which are exercised in
accord with genuine human dignity must be honored with great reverence" (GS,
51, emphasis added).
In point n. 16, Selling comments on the above passage but he does not quote
the sentence in GS,51 which begins, "Hence the acts themselves ... "7o Yet this
particular text is important for understanding how Pope Paul VI could later write
in HV without the slightest intention of introducing a form of thought alien to GS:
man "has no such dominion over his specifically sexual faculties, for these are
concerned by their very nature with the generation of life, of which God is the
source" (HV,l3). Again, the thought of HV here is (like GS) personalist in its
vision of the human person.
Moreover, it is wrong to say, as Selling does, that the bishops in GS "saw that
the biological integrity of coitus ["the ambiguous norm of the natura actus '1 did
November, 1995

49

not insure procreation, nor could one be said to affirm that value simply by
maintaining its integrity": the norm was "inadequate" and therefore "dropped."71
The response to this is simply to point out that the physical integrity of the sexual
act was never seen to guarantee procreation. Thus it was not a question of the
bishops "dropping" the norm of the natura actus and replacing it with "the
personalistic model ... which gave primary place to the evaluation of fully
human acts" [actus personae].72 This is not the reason the Church has always
taught contraception to be evil. 73 While some of the arguments to articulate and
defend this constant teaching were at times physicalist, the unchanging
characteristic
. .. has been the deliberate choice of those who practice contraception to impede the
coming to be of a new person. What has been condemned is precisely the deliberate
attempt to impede a fresh realization of the basic good of human life.74

The Objective Criteria: Based Upon "the Human Person and His Acts"
(GS,51)
This is point n. 17 in Selling's discussion of GS. Here Selling argues that this
statement from GS,51 is "the foundation of what many theologians today
consider to be the 'personalist ethic."'75 He continues:
Human persons and their acts are inseparable ... It cannot be denied that one aspect of
human activity is its corporeal and biological dimension. But moral criteria can never be
reduced to this one dimension and can only be based upon the nature of the human
person as a whole. 76

Selling's interpretation of this passage is inadequate for several reasons. Prime
among them is that his reading of GS,51 here begs the: question of what the nature
of the human person is. Is Vatican Council II proposing a fundamentally different
understanding of the human person than has been traditionally held? It is difficult
to tell from Selling's reading of the text. Yet in order to show that HV is contrary
to GS, Selling would have to show that Pope Paul was proposing a different
understanding of the person when he wrote: responsible parenthood is
determined by "the nature of marriage and its use .. ." (HV, 10, emphasis added).
The Pope speaks of "the nature of marriage" rather than "the nature of the human
person" only because he is evaluating human acts of sexual intercourse within
marriage - namely conjugal acts and not mere physical acts of sexual
intercourse as Selling claims him to be.77 Moreover, marriage exists only as a
community of persons who freely consent to love each other until death. Thus
there is no need here to contrast the person with the marital institution that he or
she wills to form and live out their Christian vocation. While the spouses retain
their individuality, they do so within the context of the "two in one flesh"
marriage relationship.
What is clear however is Selling's claim:
... conjugal sexuality was now guided by the concept of the actus personae whereby the
principal moral category was that of intentionality. Tht: fully human act is morally
qualifiable only after the consideration of all relevant factors. The concrete, material act
itself (actus externus) is only one of those factors which neither guarantees nor
automatically precludes the moral goodness of one's decision.'8
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Yet Selling's proportionalist approach here prevents him from properly
understanding the nature of the human act. On this point, William E. May has
written the following critique of proportionalism's account of the "totality" or
"wholeness" of human acts:
It is, of course, true that an act must be good in its "totality" or "wholeness" if it is to be
morally good . . . But it is not true that we cannot judge that a proposed act is morally bad
without taking into account all of its elements, for if we know that any of its elements is
bad, the whole action is morally vitiated . .. Consequently, human acts already known to
be bad by reason of the "objects" (i.e., the intelligible subject matter upon which the
agent's will must bear as a chosen means to an end) remain morally bad even if the
circumstances in which the person makes this choice or the end of whose sake it is made
are good.79

However, proportionalism focuses
. . . on the agent's "remote" end of "further intention," that is, the good the agent hopes to
realize by choosing to do x here and now. But they fail to take seriously the moral
meaning of the x and the fact that the agent freely wills the x as a chosen means, the
"proximate" end of his will act and the "present intention" that shapes his moral being.
They are thus led to redescribe human actions [i.e., the act of contracepting] in terms of
their hoped-for-results [i.e., to foster marital stability] . . . [this] conceals, rather than
reveals, what the person is doing.80

Moreover, against the claim made by Selling that "the criterion of the physical
act in itself' was eliminated in GS, the comments of May are once again useful.
May argues that the Catholic tradition never identified and morally excluded
certain actions (e.g., those deemed intrinsically evil) "independently" of the
person's will.
Rather, they are specified "by the object" . .. and by "object" they mean exactly what the
agent chooses, either as an end . .. or as a means ... The tradition affirming moral
absolutes [e.g., that one may never contracept] held that such norms do not bear upon
acts "in their natural species" but rather upon them "in their moral species ... " The
"form," the "intelligibility," of such acts is not given [contra Selling] by their nature as
physical events in abstraction from the agent's understanding and willing, but from their
intelligibly chosen objects.s l

Given our analysis up to this point, we are now better situated to see how HV is
harmonious with GS in its understanding of what the "objective criteria" are criteria which "preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human
procreation in the context of true love" (GS,51). Selling argues that it is "the
criteria based upon the nature of the human person . .. " and "not the acts which
persons do or do not perform which preserve this full sense."82 How are we to
evaluate this claim?
It is clear that Selling's view separates the human from his or her acts. While
we quoted Selling as affirming that "human persons and their acts are
inseparable," here, in order to avoid the normative force ofthe two goods (i.e.,
mutual self-giving and human procreation), which GS,51 (and HV) argue must
be respected, he speaks vaguely about objective criteria preserving these goods.
But this position is erroneous. The objective criteria are drawn from the human
person and his acts; the person then "applies" the criteria to determine the
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morality of conjugal acts: those which preserve the integrity of those objective
criteria are morally upright because they respect the two goods which were referred
to in GS,51.
The objective criteria are, again, drawn from the nature of the human person and
his acts. Thus, we must first come to an adequate understanding of the person
in order to determine all of these objective standards. To accomplish this end, we
propose the following method:
We come to understand the nature of the human person by c:oming to understand human
capacities, which we come to understand by coming to unde tand human acts, which we
come to understand by coming to understand the objects [i.e!., the goods] of those acts.83

Briefly then, we can say that the objective criteria the Council Fathers had in
mind when they formulated GS,51 were based upon what is required in order to
respect the nature of the human person (whose nature is known by understanding
the goods which that person pursues in and through freely chosen action), namely
respect for the basic human goods which constitute the objects of their intelligent
activity. Thus, the very nature of the human person consitutes the requirement to
respect and foster "an objective (i.e., real) relationship to basic human goods,
basic aspects of human personality as they are inevitably involved in certain sorts
of human acts . . . "84 By respecting these fundamental goods in one's action, one
respects the dignity of the human person, in whom these goods are meant to
flourish - both individually and communally.
In the present discussion, the human act in question is that of conjugal
intercourse. If one respects both the good of mutual self-giving and human
procreation (GS,51), one thus respects the nature of the human person, and his or
her conjugal acts are morally good. 85
Moreover, this regard for these two goods
. . . is neither procreation as a sole and absolute value, nor is it conjugal giving closed to
life. It is rather procreation as the fruit of the spouses' mutual giving or, what is the same,
a mutual giving that is in itself open to life. 86

Both GS and HV are harmonious on this matter. 87

Conclusion
Many who assume that contraception is necessary to preserve and foster
marital love often assume that contraception is a good or at least morally neutral.
We find this assumption in Selling:
If spouses are to be expected to realize the fullness of their vocation and mission, they
must be granted the liberty to apply solutions which are theoretically and humanly
credible. 88

He continues by stating that, according to GS, spollses can exercise responsible
parenthood in conflict situations when they
... act to regulate, or in extreme circumstances ... eliminate either "those acts" or "the
procreative potential of those acts." Whichever direction is chosen is a matter of the
couple's decision in conscience. So long as that decision is responsible it is morally
permissible.89
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Yet this position simply misunderstands the nature of the contraceptive act and
how it destroys the goods of human sexuality within marriage. In this regard
G.E.M. Anscombe argues:
[I]n contraceptive intercourse the intentional action is deliberately altered from being a
generative kind of action to being an act of attaining sexual climax ... it is not a question
of the further purpose or intention within which the act is done - to . . . sustain their
[marital] love, etc. - but of what the intentional act itself is: namely, the couple's use of
one another's bodies, no longer to perform a generative type of act, but one or both to
achieve orgasm. 90

The Church upholds natural family planning (NFP) not only as a safe and
effective method of regulating births, but as one morally befitting the dignity of
the human person. Unlike contraceptive techniques, NFP is not just another
"method," but rather a means which facilitates the spouses' ability to carry out
acts of procreative responsibility. Rather than offering a technical solution to the
problem of responsible parenthood, NFP provides a truly human way of
accomplishing this task.
Moreover, the bishops affirm that "a true contradiction cannot exist between
the divine laws pertaining to the transmission of life and those pertaining to the
fostering of authentic conjugal love" GS,51. In order to maintain the goods of
marital intercourse, the bishops state that "the virtue of conjugal chastity" must
be "sincerely practiced" (Ibid).
Contrary to the position held by Selling, the Church's teaching on
contraception and NFP, as expressed in HV, is truly personalistic. 91 Selling's
attempt to argue that the theology of GS permitted the use of contraception
works only if "one reads into the Council a proportionalist theory of moral
judgment."92 However, not only is porportionalism false, but GS itself did not
incorporate proportionalism into its moral teaching.
We conclude with the words of GS:
Everyone should be persuaded that human life and the task of transmitting it are not
realities bound up with this world alone. Hence they cannot be measured or perceived
only in terms of it, but always have a bearing on the eternal destiny of men (n. 51).

~
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